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Abstract 
Is the corporate income tax (CIT) still an efficient system for taxing companies today? The CIT was 
introduced when economies were characterised primarily by tangible assets and goods and by limited 
international trade. Globalisation, digitalisation and the increasing weight of immaterial goods in 
company transactions and balance sheets have rendered that system outdated. These radical changes 
call for equally radical reflections on how to reform the CIT, bearing in mind the need for a corporate 
tax system that is fit for both the digital and the traditional economy, in developing and developed 
countries alike.  
Rather than offering a complete solution, this paper discusses various approaches that could contribute 
to a solution. First, we suggest that the CIT base should always be strictly aligned with the accounting 
profit and loss account, eschewing special adjustments for tax purposes. Second, a more radical 
possibility would be to abandon altogether the reference to corporate income and tax companies 
instead on cash flow, based on destination. And, third, the possibility could also be explored to tax 
companies with reference to ‘presumptive’ indicators of activity, rather than on the basis of public 
accounts. Presumptive indicators are already used in federal systems to allocate corporate income 
among decentralised jurisdictions. These propositions would not be viable without international 
agreement, at least at the level of the European Union. Such an agreement may prove difficult given 
the conflicts of interest between EU member states and between them and the United States.  
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1. The origins of the corporate income tax  
In most national tax systems, a corporate income tax (CIT) was introduced in the 1950s “more 
as an expedient to increase revenues than as part of an organic and rational tax reform plan” 
(Cosciani, 1986, p.4). In the second half of the 20th century the process of industrialisation, the 
growth in the number of companies and the development of foreign trade progressively 
brought the issue of corporate taxation back to the fore.  
One of the main advantages of the CIT is that it helps collect substantial revenues from a 
relatively limited number of taxpayers (Bird, 2002): in 2016, CIT in the European Union 
accounted for 6.8% of total tax revenues, while before the crisis, in 2007, it accounted for 8.6%. 
The corporate tax is meant to target the return to capital; as the ultimate beneficiaries of those 
returns may be difficult to reach, administrative convenience has led to companies being taxed 
as intermediaries; in this sense, the CIT offers a backstop to revenue collection from 
shareholders. Moreover, all modern tax systems resort to companies as collectors for the tax 
authorities, e.g. for value-added taxation, labour income taxation and social security 
contributions (Lupi, 2011).  
On the other hand, Gordon and Sarada (2019) recently confirmed that countries strongly 
compete for the corporate tax base, which results in statutory corporate tax rates falling – 
roughly by half since 1980 as markets have become more open. The data presented in the book 
lead the authors to forecast a declining role for corporate income in tax systems and a likely 
shift of taxation towards some sort of consumption base.  
Over the last 40 years there have been numerous reports and commissions on a desirable 
evolution of the CIT, but none of them achieved sufficient consensus. In general, the definition 
of the corporate tax base is inherently linked to public policy objectives. Recently, Brooks (2018) 
has reviewed all the definitions of taxable income observed since the end of 1800 and 
concluded that “each concept serves a specific goal, but none is truly comprehensive, nor can 
any be”.  
A fundamental weakness of the CIT stems from the conventional nature of its tax base, 
traditionally identified with the profits shown in company accounts. Yet, accounting principles 
and balance sheet items were meant to provide information on the company’s economic 
situation and were not conceived for the purpose of taxing corporate income. The problem is 
that, while some balance sheet items merely record objective events, such as interest 
payments, expenses for salaries or purchases of inputs necessary for producing the company’s 
output, other items are the result of estimates. These include such items as losses on bad loans, 
evaluation of inventories, and depreciation allowances for company assets and investments. In 
particular, the very concept of depreciation – which was a critical component in the 
identification of the yearly return to capital for tax purposes - is based in reality on estimates 
of fairly uncertain nature. These items are anything but objective data and yet they substantially 
contribute to determining the taxable income. They may also change over time. Therefore, the 
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identification of the CIT tax base with net profits from the profit and loss account appears a 
somewhat arbitrary decision based on shaky conceptual foundations. 
A related question is whether the CIT effectively promotes the companies’ interest by defining 
a predictable and stable tax base over time, or it is cherished by companies because it implies 
a low tax burden. It is a fact that current tax systems often reconcile the considerable 
complexity in the definition of taxable income with elaborate tax reliefs (i.e. deductions) 
defined at the national level, which in practice are often a way to grant opaque and 
unsystematic reductions of the tax burden.  
Complex issues also arise concerning the integration of tax on company profit and tax on 
shareholders’ dividends. Under the classic taxation model, the CIT was levied on the company 
and subsequently also on the dividends paid to individual shareholders; however, over time 
double taxation of company profit came to be seen as a problem. For one thing, various 
distortions originate from the double taxation of profits: for example, the taxation of business 
profits is not neutral with respect to the legal form of the company; debt financing is favoured 
over equity; there is a lock-in effect for profits that generate relevant capital gains, which, in 
turn, are taxed under a special tax regime. Thus, some sort of integration between company 
taxation and shareholder taxation was eventually introduced, albeit in different forms across 
EU member states.  
At the end of the 1980s, the Dual Income Tax system, introduced by the Nordic countries, had 
a strong impact on the taxation of corporate income. This income was ideally split into two 
components – capital income and earned income – that were taxed differently: the ‘normal’ 
share of profits, equal to some notion of market returns, or of suitable bonds, was taxed at the 
same rate as the income from financial assets, or was completely exempt; the CIT was only 
applied to returns exceeding that threshold. The Dual Income Tax was an irreversible step in 
breaking the link between corporate tax and the return on capital. 
Finally, in the last thirty years, other changes in technology and market structure have had a 
deep impact on the functioning of the CIT: mainly the internationalisation of productive 
processes, the digitalisation of the economy and the increasing importance of intangible assets 
in the production of business income. These factors tend to combine and their combination 
further increases their distortive effects on the proper functioning of the CIT. As recently noted 
in a Policy Paper by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2019), the international corporate 
tax system is under unprecedented stress. They conclude that the OECD Project on Base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) that call for a taxation “where value is created” does not offer an 
adequate basis for real progress.1 
 
1 We refer to the G-20/OECD BEPS project, launched in 2013, aimed at closing gaps in international tax rules that 
allowed the corporate tax base to be eroded or artificially shifted to low/no tax jurisdictions. As noted by Grinberg 
(2018), “the consensus academic view is that any exercise to define specific sources of value creation in entirely 
subjective”. Furthermore, as already observed by IMF (2019), “if the place in which value is created can be 
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In general, the CIT is commonly considered inefficient because it tends to distort decisions on 
the place and amount of investment, the form of investment (subsidiary or branch) and the 
method of financing (debt, equity, raised locally or on international markets). In an increasingly 
digital and global setting, this calls for radical rethinking of this model of taxation. 
2. The crisis of the CIT: a perfect storm 
A serious blow to the functioning of the CIT came from the internationalisation of production 
processes. 
For decades companies with international activities had learned to take advantage of the gaps 
and asymmetries between national tax systems in order to reduce the tax burden;2 the 
absence, at the international level, of consistent tax coordination among jurisdictions gives 
companies arbitrage opportunities, leading to both the relocation of tax bases abroad (profit 
shifting) and to the erosion of these tax bases (base erosion).3 
Multinational companies have evolved towards a model of specialisation and integration in 
which single units are delegated to manage a part of the business at the global level; as result, 
there has been a massive increase in international transactions, including those within the 
company that in some cases exceed 70% of total business transactions. One of the implications 
is that companies can generate income in a particular jurisdiction without a permanent 
establishment in that territory. The new global enterprise operates and competes in a space 
“beyond” national territories (Carpentieri, 2018). The taxation of multinational companies, 
based traditionally on the combined use of residence and territorial principles (including 
complex mechanisms to deal with double taxation), has become dysfunctional.  
Further radical changes in the production processes have been brought about by the 
digitalisation of the economy. The notion of a digital economy, a term used for the first time in 
1994 (Tapscott, 1994), still lacks a clear definition, although digitalisation is increasingly 
pervading the economy and society (OECD, 2014). It is important to note that what is becoming 
digital is the economy as a whole, making it exceedingly difficult to single out digital companies 
for tax purposes. From this perspective, any changes in international tax rules to meet the 
challenge of digitalisation must eventually apply across all sectors of the economy.  
The benefits of digitalisation are enormous: first and foremost, access to information is faster 
and there is more opportunity to participate in society. Digitalisation increases the efficiency of 
 
changed, it leaves open the possibility of distortions arising from differences in tax treatment and of collectively 
damaging competition to attract the value creating activities.” 
2 “The dynamics of tax policy in a world of mobile corporations has become considerably more complex. There is 
a view that firms have become increasingly aggressive in seeking tax advantages, while there has been growing 
popular discontent about the apparent ability of corporations to relocate activity in response to tax differences” 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2018, pp. 247 and following). 
3 Among others, the instrumental use of misalignments related to the so-called hybrid financial instruments, cf. 
OECD (2015). 
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production processes and the speed of circulation of information between customers and 
suppliers; it also lowers the costs of communication.4 At the same time, questions have been 
raised on the potential impact of digitalisation on low-skilled workers.  
Digital companies have access to markets and generate profits without the need to have fixed 
on-site locations.5 The stateless income6 that these companies produce does not contribute to 
public expenditure in the countries where multinational companies sell their goods or services 
(Olbert & Spengel, 2017). In this perspective, the internet and digital platforms have created 
an ‘above territories’ territory, inaccessible to national tax authorities. Expanding the notion of 
a permanent establishment to cover significant ‘digital presence’ does not yet appear to offer 
a solution.7 
Also, digital networks have the ability to change the nature of goods: for example, material 
goods, when becoming accessible through the internet, can acquire some of the typical 
characteristics of intangible goods. A book can be read on the internet simultaneously by an 
indeterminate number of people (through, for example, Kindle technology); by proposing a 
pay-for-access service, the same network can also artificially generate a scarcity of the good, 
making it more akin to a traditional economic good.  
This new production system renders both the CIT and conventional mechanisms to avoid 
double taxation of multinational companies obsolete.  
The attempts, under way by some European states, to establish web taxes at national or EU 
level (even assuming that the obstacle of the unanimity vote for fiscal matters in the European 
Union can be overcome) are likely to raise conflicts between tax jurisdictions since such taxes 
inevitably overlap with the claims on corporate income of their state of legal residence. In 
addition, these web taxes tend to overlap with VAT, and, as does VAT, they may translate into 
higher final prices of products and services. At all events, as observed by the IMF (2019), 
attempts to isolate a ‘digital economy’ (or ‘digital activities’) for special treatment may prove 
misguided, given the pervasive impact of these technologies and their unpredictable evolution 
over time. Not surprisingly, in one of its recent policy notes, the OECD (2019) has ruled out the 
introduction of a new tax on multinational web companies, basically for two reasons. On one 
hand, it would be necessary to revise the rules of transfer pricing in order to take account of 
the peculiarities of the companies that do business on the internet; on the other hand, there 
would be a need to develop effective tools to tackle the profit shifting of multinational 
companies from the countries of the users and consumers of digital content services to the 
countries with low taxation.  
 
4 As demonstrated by Evangelista et al. (2014). 
5 On the new operations of multinational companies and the national States’ difficult adaptation to the economic 
integration produced by globalisation cf. Carpentieri L. (2018), p. 351. 
6 According to the statement coined by Kleinbard (2001 and 2011). 
7 The comprehensive solution was envisaged in European Commission (2018). 
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The third and final factor that intensifies the CIT crisis is the silent industrial revolution that has 
taken place in recent years, both in advanced countries and in many emerging economies, one 
that is well-documented by Haskel and Westlake (2018). 
Companies invest less in tangible assets, machinery, factories, offices, etc. Paradoxically, some 
of them may operate and generate profits even in the absence of traditional capital goods, 
because value today is found more in know-how than in material production. As Goodwin 
(2015) noted in a famous press interview, the “world’s largest taxi firm, Uber, owns no cars. 
The world’s most popular media company, Facebook, creates no content. The world’s most 
valuable retailer, Alibaba, carries no stock. And the world’s largest accommodation provider, 
Airbnb, owns no property. Something big is going on.” 
Investments today tend to focus on intangible assets, namely research and development, 
software, marketing, intellectual property, etc. New business models rely heavily on these 
intangible assets that are very hard to value. This change has two consequences. First, there 
exists no satisfactory measurement system that is reliable and stable over time for intangible 
assets. Second, the prevalence of these assets over the material ones changes the way the 
economy operates.  
Intangible assets have different economic characteristics from tangible ones: they are often 
non-rival, thus they can be enjoyed by many persons simultaneously; they tend to become 
obsolete and lose market value in a short time, making it almost impossible to recover the initial 
investment with the sale of the asset (‘sunkenness’); they generate spillover effects vis-à-vis 
other companies, weakening the incentive to invest (also because the protection of intellectual 
property rights is inefficient and expensive); they acquire greater value if used in combination 
(synergy), something that tends to favour larger companies.8  
The evaluation of a physical asset for tax purposes can be carried out by looking, for example, 
at the value at which the machinery or property can be resold. But for intangible assets, there 
is often no such reference. How does one value an intangible investment whose purpose is the 
improvement of software? Whether the investment has created value can be assessed and 
measured only after the software is sold together with the entire application or device. The 
possibility of this happening and the timeframe in which this will happen are very uncertain and 
variable. 
These considerations make Haskel and Westlake (2018) conclude that at the global level there 
is a significant underestimation of investments in intangible assets, which are often recorded 
in company accounts as current expenses. For these expenditures, the notion of yearly 
depreciation may often prove meaningless. Indeed, Haskel and Westlake stress that computing 
the service life of this type of intangible investment and, consequently, the annual amortisation 
 
8 A further change regards the ability to finance intangible investments in relation to traditional ones: the presence 
of a sunk cost makes them less suitable to be financed through debt. Equity financing also tends to be lower than 
that needed because this type of asset is often under-reported in the financial statements due to uncertainty and 
measurement problems. Finally, in many countries and for many companies there is not much venture capital 
available. 
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rate, is close to impossible, as the company does not know for how long the immaterial good 
can be exploited in production. 
3. The CIT crisis in the European Union and the United States  
Within the European Union, profit shifting of companies’ income was in part favoured by the 
principles of free movements of capital, freedom of establishment and non-discrimination 
among residents and non-residents. For a long time, it was believed that those rights would 
have generated more efficiency and productivity, rather than generating distortions. Empirical 
evidence seemed to indicate that real investment flows are not highly reactive to the 
differences in tax rates among jurisdictions and that, with open tax competition, different tax 
rates may over time come to correspond to the locational benefits offered to investors.  
However, the increase in capital mobility, the widespread practices of aggressive tax planning 
by multinational businesses and the behaviour of some member states eager to attract capital 
to their jurisdictions have led to the emergence of true tax havens within the European Union. 
Derogations provided for in Article 65 of the TFEU on the freedom of movement of capital and 
other tools offered by the Treaties try to limit profit shifting, but the increasing erosion of tax 
bases appears very large (Jansky, 2019). 
Within the European Union, the attempt to tackle the CIT crisis and find new coordinated ways 
for taxing multinational companies are further complicated by the significant differences in 
national tax systems.  
While it is true that the European Treaties do not explicitly mention the harmonisation of direct 
taxation, Article 115 of the TFEU provides for European initiatives in the “approximation of such 
laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the member states as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market”. This provision has created the legal basis 
for the various harmonisation measures undertaken over the years which, however, require 
unanimity to be adopted. 
The first proposals for coordination date back to more than fifty years ago.9  In the early 1990s 
the Ruding Report explicitly recognised that the ‘spontaneous’ convergence of tax systems that 
took place in the previous decade had not been enough to resolve the market distortions 
created by differences in the national tax systems. The Report indicated some priorities: (a) the 
elimination of discriminatory provisions; (b) the fixing of a minimum tax rate, to limit harmful 
tax competition; (c) the transparency of tax incentives. These proposals received a lukewarm 
reaction from the Council, which only adopted the measures that were deemed essential for 
the proper functioning of the internal market (the parent-subsidiary directive, the directive on 
mergers and the Arbitration Agreement on transfer pricing).  
 
9 The 1962 Neuman Report and the 1970 Van den Tempel Report called for a certain degree of harmonisation of 
direct taxation. 
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The dossier on the coordination of national tax systems regained momentum in 1996 at the 
Ecofin meeting in Verona. The Commission identified three tax policy issues that the European 
Union needed to address: (a) the stabilisation of tax revenues; (b) the proper functioning of the 
internal market; (c) the promotion of employment. According to the Commission, the tax 
burden had been shifted from the more mobile (capital) to the less mobile productive factors 
(work); in addition, lack of coordination between national tax systems had become a source of 
distortions generating unemployment.  A High-Level Group chaired by Dawn Primarolo was 
established to counter unfair tax practices and to draft a report suggesting some areas of joint 
action. The ‘Monti Package’ was subsequently approved and consisted of two directives (for 
the taxation of savings and interest and royalties), a code of conduct for comparing unfair tax 
measures, and some guidelines on state aid rules. 
In 2000, the Lisbon European Council adopted the strategic goal to make the European Union 
“the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”. In 2001, the 
Commission presented a communication (European Commission, 2001), that affirmed the need 
to adapt company taxation in the European Union to the Lisbon Strategy with the aim of 
ensuring a better functioning of the internal market through tackling the inefficiencies created 
by the differences in national tax rules. It pointed out that compliance costs, problems in 
transfer pricing rules and the ample room for double taxation undermined European 
competitiveness, preventing companies from enjoying the full benefits of the internal market.  
The Commission communication discussed various technical options to address these 
problems. The first option was Home State Taxation (HST), to be based on the voluntary mutual 
recognition of the tax regime in force in the other member states (Lodin & Gammie, 2001). The 
companies operating in more than one member state could calculate their tax base in 
accordance with the tax rules of the country of residence of the parent company. The taxable 
income thus determined, after allowing for the netting of cross-border gains and losses 
according to the law of the country of origin, would then be shared among the member states 
in function of the payroll and/or revenues of each country; and each country would apply its 
own tax rates on this fraction of the taxable income. This proposal had the political advantage 
of not requiring any harmonisation of the tax rules, but it also presented various challenges – 
the main one being that companies subject to different tax laws would have had to work side 
by side in the same market, while each tax administration would need to be able to verify tax 
statements made according the rules of all member states. The HST system could only have 
worked in the presence of a substantial convergence of the tax and legal systems of EU 
countries, which was not the case.10 
Subsequently, the Commission turned to a different approach, the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) model.11 In its first version, the CCCTB was proposed as an optional 
tax system that firms could choose as an alternative to that of their country of residence. 
According to this proposal, there would be an agreement on a common set of rules for the 
 
10 Among others, Klemm (2001). 
11 For an assessment of the main elements of the proposal, cf. Fuest (2008). 
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calculation of taxable profits. The common base would then be consolidated at EU level and 
apportioned amongst the member states according to a formula based on three factors (sales, 
employment and tangible assets). It was, therefore, necessary for countries to adopt a common 
definition of the tax base, but also to agree on the definition of consolidated profit, given that 
the rules for consolidation at group level differed greatly among countries. The main advantage 
of this system consisted of the possibility to compensate losses for companies belonging to the 
same group but located in different countries and to eliminate problems related to transfer 
prices. It should be noted, however, that these benefits would have only affected the 
companies located within the European Union – or the subset of EU countries adhering to the 
system – and not those partly located in third countries.  
The proposal struggled to build sufficient support among the member states and in 2016 the 
project for a common tax base was re-elaborated from a different perspective (European 
Commission, 2016). The new proposal for a CCCTB provides for two steps: the first is the 
definition of a common corporate tax base (CCTB), and the second includes the consolidation 
of the common corporate tax base (CCCTB). Great efforts were made in the past to arrive at a 
common definition of the tax base (necessary for taking advantage of the benefits of deducting 
the losses on a pan-European basis), which however turned out to be more the sum than the 
synthesis of the different approaches. In the end, the CCCTB would be allocated among the 
member states based on presumptive indicators, according to the ‘formulary apportionment’ 
method.12 Recently, in her Political Guidelines, the designated President of the European 
Commission has announced her commitment to achieve the longstanding goal of a common 
consolidated corporate tax base (von der Leyen, 2019). 
Once again, the CCCTB appears to be an attempt to rescue the corporate income tax almost as 
it is today; the tax base would always be represented by profits, but it would then be 
apportioned among the several tax jurisdictions through indicators. An agreement does not 
appear in sight. It would require the member states to agree on the rules for determining 
corporate income on a consolidated basis at EU level, and then on the formula for dividing this 
income among the different tax jurisdictions. Furthermore, even if both agreements were 
reached, the solution would be limited to the member states, or only to those that adopted 
them under an enhanced cooperation. 
The European Commission (2018) has recognised that “the CCCTB with its current scope would 
not offer a structural solution to some of the important challenges in taxing businesses of the 
digital economy”. This is because of its limited scope (it is mandatory only for large 
multinational companies) and because the definition of a permanent establishment in the 
CCCTB follows the one currently applied internationally. Moreover, the profit allocation rules 
(the apportionment formula) in the CCCTB may not sufficiently capture the digital activities of 
a company as the rules on a taxable nexus for digital activities are not considered. 
 
12 This system has been operating for a long time in Canada and the United States. For a more detailed description 
of the system cf. Weiner (2005). 
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A main weakness of the CCCTB, however, remains its perimeter of application, which at best 
would cover the European Union. Moreover, the reaction of the European Union regarding 
issues of taxation of the digital economy appears too slow with respect to the rapid changes 
taking place in the economy.  
Within the EU the introduction of shared tax measures requires unanimity. The Commission’s 
proposal to shift from unanimity in tax matters to ‘qualified majority voting’ could accelerate 
agreement over a course of action for a Digital Service Tax (DST) at an EU level, but in the race 
to achieve consensus on redesigning international tax rules so that they apply effectively to 
digitalised business, the OECD appears to be the leading.  
In its “Tax challenges arising from digitalisation: interim report”, the OECD (2018) emphasised 
the need for a global plan and a long-term solution, just days before the European Commission 
released both a long-term and an interim proposal on 21 March 2018.13 
This difference in approach initiated a geopolitical struggle between short-term measures 
driven by political expediency and the OECD’s vision of more long-term measures and a 
principled riposte to unilateral actions that could jeopardise its chance of success. The OECD’s 
interim report delivered some important conclusions in relation to the taxation of the digital 
economy. This report included confirmation that the digital economy could not be ‘ring-fenced’ 
from the broader economy and noted that any interim measures would need to be consistent 
with international tax and trade obligations.  
Moreover, while Europe and the OECD were discussing their proposals and seeking to develop 
a general consensus on the best way to tax digital companies, the US with the Trump tax reform 
has ‘challenged’ the other countries and in particular the European Union, putting a ‘mortgage’ 
on all the income produced by US multinationals everywhere in the world through its 
subsidiaries and exceeding 10% of the value of their instrumental assets.  
At the end of 2017, President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act bringing sweeping 
changes to the tax code and, in particular, turning US corporate income tax from a ‘worldwide’ 
system to a ‘territorial’ system. 
 
13 The European Commission’s interim solution envisages the introduction on a transitional basis of an indirect tax 
on revenues from certain digital services for which the participation of the users plays a central role in value 
creation. This tax should be levied on companies with worldwide revenues higher than €750 million, of which more 
than €50 million is generated within the EU. This DST would apply to revenues from three types of digital services: 
a) advertisements placed on a digital interface and directed towards the users of that interface; b) the revenues 
from offering multilateral digital interfaces that allow users to interact among themselves and eventually facilitate 
the supply of peer-to-peer goods and services (social networks, sharing economy, etc.); c) services that transmit 
the data collected on the users and generated by the users’ digital activities on the digital interfaces. The long-
term proposal intends to reform corporate tax rules by identifying a new kind of nexus (which overcomes the 
traditional notion of permanent establishment) based on ‘significant digital presence’. The significant digital 
presence in a member state would be verified, in a tax period, when the company that provides digital services 
through an interface meets one or more of the following conditions: the revenues from providing digital services 
to users in a jurisdiction exceed €7 million, the number of users of digital service in a member state exceeds 
100,000, or if the number of business contracts for digital services exceeds 3,000. 
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In a worldwide system, corporate income is taxed in the country of tax residence, regardless of 
where it is gained. Under the territorial tax system, only domestic earnings are subject to 
taxation in each jurisdiction and profits gained abroad are excluded. Under the ‘worldwide’ 
system, US multinationals were taxed on income earned abroad, but they could avoid the tax 
by deferring the repatriation of profits (‘tax deferral’). This was at the origin of a lock-in effect, 
i.e. the parking in overseas subsidiaries of undistributed profits – which over time came to pile 
up into enormous amounts. 
With the Trump reform, US multinationals will continue to benefit from the de-taxation, as the 
dividends distributed from foreign subsidiaries will not be taxed in the US, with a system very 
similar to that adopted in most EU member states. In this way, US multinationals are 
encouraged to bring the money back to the US in the future because profits earned abroad and 
repatriated as dividends will not be taxed. For earnings generated in lower-tax jurisdictions, the 
US company will pay this lower tax rate on company profits and send home dividends that will 
remain untaxed. For past undistributed dividends, the reform introduced a one-off levy, 
regardless of the country in which they are made, at a rate of 8% for illiquid activities and 15.5% 
for liquid ones. 
Companies with over $500 million in annual gross receipts at group level for the preceding 
three years are subjected to the Base Erosion Anti-abuse Tax (BEAT). The BEAT is a minimum 
tax payable by companies resident in the US who deduct from their tax base ‘payments’ in 
favour of foreign affiliates for the services received, for the use of intangible assets or for the 
purchase of depreciable assets. According to this approach, even in the total absence of tax 
avoidance, the US corporation tax, calculated in the ordinary way, cannot in any case be less 
than 10% on a deemed14 tax base. 
The Trump reform risks intensifying tax competition globally, leading to a possible erosion of 
tax bases in EU countries. Moreover, the reform will affect the fiscal planning strategies of 
multinationals as the lower taxes on the American companies increase the fiscal attraction of 
the United States relative to other countries by influencing the way companies choose to invest 
or move profits. 
US tax reform has strongly relaunched tax competition between countries; these provisions 
make it even more urgent to find a coordinated solution at the OECD and EU levels. 
  
 
14 This tax base is calculated as US profit plus base-eroding payments – such as royalties and management fees – 
made by US corporations to related foreign persons. 
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4. Other options for the taxation of business income 
Tax systems must adapt to the radical changes in business models and activities. To this end, it 
appears that it would not suffice to update or to amend the current tax systems; they must be 
reformed.15 
Devereux and Vella explore a broad variety of solutions: the most radical is the elimination of 
the CIT; an intermediate option is to determine the taxable income of the company and 
implement a ‘transparency’ tax on the shareholders, allocating income according to each 
shareholder’s ownership share; a further possibility is to provide for a tax based on the location 
of the consumers to be implemented on the profits or on the cash flow.16 
At all events, if one wants to keep the taxation of business income anchored to the profit and 
loss accounts, these should become the tax base also for tax purposes, thus eliminating all 
‘twin-track’ fiscal distinctions that greatly contribute to the opacity of tax systems, and that 
often open the door for aggressive tax planning operations (notably, but by no means solely, in 
Italy). The rules for determining the tax base of the CIT should be the same as used for statutory 
financial statements and they should remain unchanged over time. This principle has a major 
advantage: it creates a strong disincentive to tarnish the budgetary procedure with the aim of 
reducing the tax burden since this would worsen the company’s public results for shareholders 
and market investors. There would also be a strong incentive for the company to provide a fair 
evaluation of intangible assets and digital activities. In a more general perspective, it would 
increase the transparency of the CIT and, at international level, improve comparability among 
national tax systems.  
An entirely different approach, which would rescind altogether the link between taxation and 
business profit, could be the cash flow tax proposed for the first time at the end of the 1970s 
by the Meade Committee. The cash flow tax records transactions at the time of the payment, 
disregarding accounting rules entirely.17 The advantage would be twofold: cash flows are easier 
to track, and the earnings are more difficult to manipulate. The tax base would be based on the 
same factors as those of the formulary apportionment of the European proposed CCCTB, that 
is the revenues arising from sales of goods and services net of productive inputs (assets and 
labour cost). This system would also provide a strong incentive to invest in both material and 
immaterial assets, because the purchase of these assets would result in an immediate 
reduction of the taxable base. In the cash flow tax, the financial components would no longer 
be relevant and thus the present distortion in favour of debt financing (as interest rates on debt 
are deductible as a cost from the tax base, and dividends are not) would be eliminated.  
 
15 Not by chance Devereux (2018) writes: “I believe that we are in the midst of a shifting of the tectonic plates of 
international taxation of profits” . 
16 Among others: Devereux and Vella (2017), Devereux and Vella (2014). 
17 Also, for some years in Italy there have been discussions on the possibility of taxing the company on a cash flow 
basis rather than in accordance with the accrual principle, cf. Lupi and Versiglioni (2015).  
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In its original formulation, the cash flow tax was conceived as a tax on the cash flow of domestic 
producers (‘origin-based’) and, as such, it encouraged companies to move their production or 
fiscal residence to countries with low taxation. More recently, this aspect has been 
reconsidered (Auerbach et al., 2017); the tax would be based on destination (Destination-Based 
Cash Flow Tax – DBCFT), that is taxing rights would be allocated to the jurisdiction in which the 
consumer (a factor much less open to manipulation) is located rather than to the jurisdiction 
of the company’s production or residence.18 
The DBCFT “is a tax applied to the cash flow of all domestic consumption and that excludes the 
cash flow of goods or services that are produced domestically, but consumed elsewhere” 
(Pomerleau & Etin, 2016). The border adjustments included in the proposal are “taxes or tax 
reductions that apply when payments for goods and services cross international borders”. 
Imported goods purchased/consumed domestically are subject to the tax while goods 
produced domestically and sold internationally are exempt. Therefore, the DBCFT would 
lighten the levy on exports and tax imports, similarly to what happens with VAT but, unlike the 
latter, it would retain the payroll deduction from the tax base. 
The advantages of the DBCFT are numerous: the elimination of the company’s residence as a 
key factor for tax purposes; the solution of the problem of taxing mobile factors; the removal 
of the incentives to manipulate transfer prices, as intra-group transactions would be ignored 
by the tax system; the full and immediate deductibility of investments; the absence of 
distortions on the companies’ financing choices, since financial flows are excluded from the 
base. From an economic viewpoint, the DBCFT would be a more efficient tax as it is less 
distortive with respect to choices of location and funding. It would also be more robust in 
relation to the practices of tax avoidance, including intra-group financing and transactions. 
As noted by IMF (2019, p.27), adoption of a DBCFT (even unilateral) is not expected to affect 
trade since that tax does not create a preference for domestic production over imports. All 
sales to final consumers, imported or domestically produced, are taxed, and all domestic costs 
are deductible, whether used to produce for exports or for the domestic market. Thus, if 
adopted universally, the DBCFT would eliminate both profit shifting and tax competition. A 
recent paper provided some estimates on the revenue implications of this tax using national 
accounts data: on average, a universally adopted DBCFT surprisingly generates a similar level 
of revenue as the CIT, but some countries lose while others win (Hebous et al., 2019). Countries 
with a large trade surplus would face the largest decline in revenue, at least in the short term. 
Unilateral DBCFT adoption can generate negative spillover effects, which are found to be 
sizeable if the DBCFT country is large and integrated. Spillovers could prompt other countries 
 
18 As noted by IMF (2019, p. 25) “the notion of user participation as creating a taxing right, though conceptually 
quite distinct, in practice allocates some taxing rights to jurisdictions in which final users of a product are located. 
Indeed, and though doubtless unintended, the call to tax where value is created might seem to imply some taxing 
rights in the destination country since there is no value without buyers.” 
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to adopt a DBCFT, as a rising number of DBCFT countries raises the cost of maintaining source-
based CITs. 
On the other hand, the DBCFT would pose problems both from an administrative and legal 
point of view. First of all, if adopted unilaterally by individual countries, DBCFT could lead to 
either double taxation or no taxation, as companies exporting from a DBCFT jurisdiction would 
not pay any CIT, neither in the home nor in the country of destination of its exports; while, on 
the other hand, a company exporting from a traditional to a DBCTF taxation country would be 
taxed by both jurisdictions.  
A further issue is that in the transition from the traditional tax to the cash flow tax, the full tax-
deductibility of the investment would co-exist with the deduction of the costs not yet amortised 
and, therefore, would lead to revenue shortfalls. Above all, the cash flow tax would risk 
destabilising the international agreements built on the traditional notion of profit: if the new 
tax were not recognised in the bilateral treaties against double taxation, foreign investors could 
lose the right to the credit on their domestic tax and all bilateral and multilateral agreements 
on fiscal cooperation signed in the last decades would become inapplicable and would need to 
be amended. Border adjustment on direct taxes is also considered discriminatory and therefore 
prohibited under the WTO,19 since for imported goods the deduction of the costs of labour 
would not be allowed, thus creating discrimination between domestic and foreign labour.20 
Generally, the change toward territorial taxation strengthens the case for some form of 
minimum taxation on foreign earnings. If active business income earned in foreign subsidiaries 
is taxed only by the source country, there is an incentive to make domestic income appear to 
arise in low-tax jurisdictions abroad, and so escape taxation at home. Charging some minimum 
tax on income from abroad can then provide a backstop, in the absence of which territoriality 
can jeopardise domestic taxation. In this prospective, the US GILTI tax, introduced by the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, is a minimum tax on outbound foreign direct investments returns. 
Finally, an even more radical reform could entail taxing corporations through a presumptive 
tax. At the beginning of the 1990s, Sadka and Tanzi (1993) suggested taxing companies through 
a presumptive tax based on the tangible assets owned, considering the latter as indicators of 
average annual business activity and, therefore, of the location benefits enjoyed by the 
businesses.  
The option to tax with moderate rates, in a presumptive manner, certain indicators of real 
economic activity in each jurisdiction – such as sales, fixed assets or employees – can be seen 
in the same line (Micossi & Parascandolo, 2010). This approach offers great advantages in terms 
of efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation, including the full autonomy of national fiscal 
administrations. These factors cannot be easily moved around the group to avoid taxation: 
 
19 WTO condemned, for example, the regime of export subsidies enjoyed by the United States Foreign Sales 
Corporation (FSC). Read more in Schoen (2016).  
20 This incompatibility with the WTO could, however, be overcome with proper precautions. For further 
information, cf. Grinberg (2017). 
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relocating employees to a low-tax jurisdiction involves much more than transferring intangible 
assets to a letterbox company in such a jurisdiction, and a firm has even less power over the 
location of its customers. 
The indicators on which presumptive taxation would be based are the same as those used for 
the allocation of income with the formulary apportionment system provided for by the CCCBT. 
In this case, however, taxation would be applied directly based on these indicators without first 
going through the cumbersome circuit of identifying a transnational common tax base and an 
unambiguous criterion of consolidation of the tax base for the groups.  
Today, obviously, this proposal should take intangible assets into account, because of their 
relevance. Since they are by definition mobile among jurisdictions and can be easily used to 
reduce the tax burden, it would be very difficult to determine an equitable presumptive 
indicator for them. In this perspective the presumptive tax could be combined with a minimum 
tax.  
The reference to a wide tax base, without exemptions or deductions, would allow for the 
application of a low tax rate. This system would require, ideally, a ‘source’ type tax with no 
further taxation of capital income at the personal level. There would be no offsetting for cross-
border losses, in line with the concept of this taxation as a tax on benefits that companies enjoy 
in a certain fiscal jurisdiction. In accordance with this assumption, the amount paid in relation 
to this tax would not be deductible from other taxes. The interest paid on funding through debt 
would be taxed, thus again eliminating the tax incentive in favour of debt. 
Taxation of companies based on locational benefits in a fiscal jurisdiction would leave space for 
substantial differences in taxation rates among jurisdictions, since countries that offer more 
tangible and intangible infrastructures (education and research, primarily) would be able to 
apply higher tax rates than jurisdictions that offer less, without fearing the flight of productive 
capital.  
5. Conclusions 
The radical changes in companies’ business models induced by globalisation, digitalisation and 
the prevalence of intangible assets seem to have made the CIT crisis irreversible.  
The corporate income tax was introduced when economies were characterised primarily by 
tangible assets and goods (thus more easily controlled and evaluated) and by limited 
international trade. This system appears inadequate to deal with the vertical integration of the 
company’s functions at the international level, a context in which inter-company transactions 
may constitute most of a company’s transactions.  
With the digitalisation of the economy, a global corporation produces profits at a global level: 
companies’ revenues become mobile, as do the flows of dividends, interest or royalties. These 
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radical changes evoke similarly radical reflections on how to reform the corporate tax system 
to make it more efficient and equitable with respect to the evolution of production models.  
First, if the corporate income tax remains anchored to the profit and loss accounts, it would be 
essential to use the latter as an unequivocal reference in time, also for tax purposes, avoiding 
the variations, which may increase or decrease the tax burden, which are typical of the so-
called twin-track. This would create a strong disincentive to distort the balance sheet in order 
to reduce the tax burden since that would worsen the companies’ bottom lines, which are key 
for investors; it would also increase transparency and comparability on effective tax burdens at 
the international level among jurisdictions. 
Second, a more radical solution would be to abandon the reference to corporate income: a 
cash flow tax based on destination could be assessed for taxing companies. This approach 
would require appropriate solutions for issues of compatibility with the current rules and with 
administrative management. However, once introduced, it would be a significant simplification 
of the system. There would also be significant gains in terms of the neutrality and efficiency of 
the fiscal system as well as in companies’ investment and financing choices.  
Finally, an even more radical reform would include taxing corporations through a presumptive 
tax. The tax base could be determined on uniform criteria built on company activity indicators.  
Companies would be taxed at source – and the tax would represent a kind of counterpart to 
the benefits of localisation obtained by the company in each jurisdiction. There would be no 
consolidation of results across jurisdictions, with all the problems of definition that it entails, 
and no longer even cross-border offsetting of losses or inter-company transfers. The 
advantages in terms of neutrality and efficiency would be considerable. 
All the solutions outlined above require agreement on the new system (at least) on a 
continental basis (that is, at the level of the European Union). However, such an agreement 
between the European Union and other advanced countries on one side, and the United States 
on the other, within the OECD framework, does not appear likely due to the conflict of interest 
between the United States and all the other countries in the taxation of large multinational 
digital companies. 
In its most recent documents, the OECD underlines that in the absence of multilateral action 
there is a risk of uncoordinated, unilateral action, both to attract a greater tax base and to 
protect the existing tax base, with adverse consequences for all countries, large and small, 
developed and developing as well as taxpayers. Recognising that it would be difficult to ring-
fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes, the OECD is trying to 
develop a new approach (under its Pillar II framework) that leaves jurisdictions free to 
determine their own tax systems, including whether they have a corporate income tax and 
where they set their tax rates, but takes into account the right of other jurisdictions to apply 
rules to ensure that all internationally operating businesses pay a minimum level of tax. More 
ambitious proposals to harmonise corporate income tax for multinationals internationally 
(under the OECD Pillar I framework) still appear to be barely in their infancy. 
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We would like to stress, in conclusion, that our discussion falls short of designing a complete 
system, but rather opens the way to experimental directions to start reflecting on the new CIT 
needed for the digital and immaterial economy. Our considerations are driven by a concern to 
establish an intelligible and efficient conceptual basis for the definition of the CIT, and therefore 
we are not yet able to tackle aspects concerning the impact on different tax jurisdictions, 
economic sectors or company kinds. Nor can we speculate on the impact of our tentative 
suggestions, were they to be adopted Europe-wide, on the relationships with other important 
tax jurisdictions where most digital multinationals are located. 
  
18 | CARPENTIERI, MICOSSI & PARASCANDOLO 
 
References 
Auerbach, A., M. Devereux, M. Keen and J. Vella (2017), “The Destination-based cash flow 
taxation”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working paper no. 17.  
Bird, R. (2002), “Why Tax Corporations?”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 56 
(no. 5, May).  
Brooks, J. (2018),” The Definitions of Income”, Georgetown University Law Centre. 
Carpentieri, L. (2018), “La crisi del binomio diritto-territorio e la tassazione delle imprese 
multinazionali”, in Rivista di diritto tributario, no. 4, I. 
Cosciani, C. (1986), “Aspetti economici dell’imposta sulle società”, Quaderni Assonime, Rome.  
Desai, M. A. and D. Dharmapala (2018), “Revisiting the uneasy case for corporate taxation in an 
uneasy world”, Journal of the British academy, no 6. 
Devereux, M. (2018), “The digital services ‘Sutton’ tax”, Centre For Business Taxation, 
University of Oxford, 23 October. 
Devereux, M. and J. Vella (2017), “Implication of digitalization for international corporate tax 
reform”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper no. 7. 
Devereux, M. and J. Vella (2014), “Are we heading towards a corporate tax system fit for the 
21st century?”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper no. 25. 
European Commission (2018), “Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to 
the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence”, COM(2018) 147 final, 21 March. 
European Commission (2016), “Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)”, COM(2016)683, 25 October. 
European Commission (2001), “Company Taxation in the Internal Market”, COM(2001) 582 
final.  
Evangelista, R., P. Guerrieri and V. Meliciani (2014), “The economic impact of digital 
technologies in Europe”, Economics of Innovation and New technology, 23 (8). 
Fuest, C. (2008), “The European Commission's Proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base”, Oxford University Centre for Business taxation, Working Paper no. 23. 
Goodwin, T. (2015), “The battle is for the custumer interface”, TechCrunch, 3 March. 
Gordon, R. and S. Sarada (2019), “The role of corporate income tax”, Cambridge University 
Press.  
Grinberg, I. (2018), “International Taxation in the Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the 
Current Debate”, Georgetown University Law Center. 
Grinberg, I. (2017), “The House GOP Blueprint Can Be Drafted to Comply with WTO Rules”, 
Georgetown University Law Center. 
Haskel, J. and S. Westlake (2018), “Capitalism without Capital: the Rise of the Intangible 
Economy”, Princeton University Press.  
Hebous, S., A. Klemm and S. Stausholm (2019), “Revenue Implications of Destination-Based 
Cash-Flow Taxation”, IMF Working Paper 19/7. 
OVERHAULING CORPORATE TAXATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY | 19 
 
 
IMF (2019), “Corporate Taxation in The Global Economy”, March 2019. 
Jansky, P. (2019), “European Parliament TAX3 Committee: Hearing on Evaluation of Tax Gap”, 
23 January. 
Kleinbard, E. D. (2011), “The Lessons of Stateless Income”, Tax Law Review, Vol. 65, p. 99, 2011. 
Kleinbard, E. D. (2001), “Stateless Income”, in Fl. Tax Rev. 
Klemm, A. (2001), “Economic review of formulary methods in EU corporate tax reform”, EU 
Corporate tax reform, Report of the CEPS task force, CEPS, Brussels. 
Lodin, S. O. and M. Gammie, (2001), “Home State Taxation”, Amsterdam. 
Lupi, R. (2011), “Manuale professionale di diritto tributario - La tassazione attraverso le aziende 
tra diritto ed economia”, Milan, IPSOA WKI. 
Lupi R. and M. Versiglioni (2015), “Il “reddito liquido” e la relativizzazione del principio di 
competenza”, Dialoghi tributari, no. 8.  
Micossi, S. and P. Parascandolo (2010), “The taxation of multinational enterprises in the 
European Union: views on the options for an overhaul”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 203. 
OECD (2019), “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy”, Policy 
Notes, 23 January. 
OECD (2018), “Tax challenges arising from digitalisation: interim report”, 16 March. 
OECD (2015), “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements. Final Report”, 25 
October. 
OECD (2014), “BEPS Report Action I: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy”, 24 
March. 
Olbert, M. and C. Spengel (2017), “International Taxation in the Digital Economy: Challenge 
Accepted?”, World Tax Journal, February. 
Pomerleau, K. and S. J. Etin (2016), “The House GOP’s Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax 
Explained”, Tax Foundation, June 30.  
Sadka, E. and V. Tanzi (1993), “A tax on gross assets of enterprises as a form of presumption 
taxation”, Bulletin of the international Bureau of fiscal documentation. 
Schoen, W. (2016), “Destination-Based Income Taxation and WTO Law: a Note”, Max Planck 
Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Working Paper no. 3.  
Tapscott, D. (1994), “The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked 
Intelligence”, McGraw-Hill. 
von der Leyen, U. (2019), “A Union that strives for more. My agenda for Europe”, 16 July. 
Weiner, J. (2005), “Formulary apportionment and group taxation in the European Union: 
insights from the United States and Canada”, Taxation Papers no. 8, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
 CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, CEPS is widely recognised as the most experienced and 
authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS acts as a leading forum 
for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research capacity and 
complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
 Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today 
 Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
 Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process 
 Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations 
Assets 
 Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable 
analysts 
 Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research 
expertise and to extend its outreach 
 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
board for the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
